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Introduction
Tax incentives of retirement savings are present in many countries. They could be rationalized as a mean to achieve that individuals accumulate more wealth for retirement. This could happen through two channels: i) the existence of these tax incentives makes individuals to save more during their working lives, and ii) they change the composition of wealth portfolios by increasing the weight of "long-run" savings, as, for instance, contributions to pension plans, which are less liquid and, thus, less likely to be used before retirement.
Indeed, contributions to pension funds rise significantly with tax incentives, particularly among individuals with age close to retirement and facing high marginal tax rates, a fact that we document extensively in this paper for the Spanish case. However, the extent to which tax incentives rise retirement savings by increasing the portfolio weight of "long-run" savings is debatable, as it depends on the existence of borrowing constraints that could preclude the possibility of obtaining credit using pension wealth as collateral.
Hence, the empirical literature on tax incentives on retirement savings has focused on the first channel mentioned above, namely, their impact on saving and consumption. Whether tax incentives do indeed raise saving, rather than simply producing a change in the composition of households' wealth portfolios, is a controversial issue. In the empirical literature on the effectiveness of tax incentives at raising savings, there are dissenting sets of results. 1 For instance, while Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995 and find that in the US funds accumulated in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans are mostly net additions to saving, Gale and Scholz (1994) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) conclude that tax incentives of retirement savings have a strong effect on the allocation of saving and wealth, but little or not effect on the level, and that virtually all of the reported increase in financial assets in IRAs can be attributed to stock market booms, higher real interest rates, and shifts in non financial assets, debt, pensions and Social Security's wealth. 2 Hubbard and Skinner (1996) argue that probably "the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes", as the results seem to rely on the assumed degree of substitution between taxable saving and saving eligible for tax incentives. 3 Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield (2004) notice that new contributors to IRAs,who face higher marginal interest rates, should experiment a lower consumption growth than old contributors if the tax-favoured scheme is effectively rising saving. However, they find that the stock of non-IRAs assets grows less for new contributors than for continuing contributors, being the most likely cause that new contributors are reshuffling existing portfolios into the IRAs, and not changing their consumption-saving decision.
there is likely to be some gradual adjustment to the desired level of savings and to the optimal wealth composition after the introduction of tax incentives for retirement savings, and this adjustment could be different for individuals of different characteristics and wealth. This implies that the effects of tax incentives at the moment of its introduction are likely to be different to their effects in a situation in which they have been operative for some time, when plausibly individuals' wealth composition is closer to the desired one and the limits to exempted contributions from income taxation could be less binding.
In this paper we aim at providing empirical evidence on the impact of tax incentives on saving by examining the effects of what we consider an unique episode: the introduction of tax incentives of retirement in Spain in 1988. We argue that by using the introduction of the exemption as an arguably exogenousto-the-individual change in incentives to save, our analysis may be less affected by problems i) and ii) than previous work. Of course by focusing on the introduction of the exemption, our analysis is affected by problem iii): We provide little information about the impact of the exemption when the program has been operative for a long period. 6 Pension funds in Spain, the financial instruments where retirement savings are deposited under some fiscal favorable treatment, have similar features to post-86 IRAs in the US. Contributions to those funds were tax-exempted for all individuals up to a generous amount (4,500 euro in 1988), allowed tax-free accrual of savings but limited disposal of accumulated funds before retirement. Finally, upon lump-sum withdrawal after retirement, taxation depends on the form of withdrawal: if redemption takes place in a lump-sum payment 40% is exempted from income taxation, if redemption is in form of annuity, then it is taxed at marginal tax rate on income. We analyze the impact of the introduction of these tax incentives in two steps. First, we use a panel of tax returns to identifying the population cohorts who most used these incentives. Secondly, we use a panel of household consumption to estimating the impact of tax incentives on consumption/saving of different population groups.
We think that this paper contributes to the literature on tax incentives to save in three different ways. First, we are able to use data spanning the periods before and after the introduction of tax-favoured retirement plans. In the absence of a controlled experiment, such as in Duflo et al. (2006) , examining the evolution of savings around the introduction of the tax exemption mitigates some of the problems in the analysis of IRAs in the US, that typically study the impact using post-introduction trends among different groups in the population.
Secondly, we focus on the impact of the introduction of the pension funds program on household consumption, rather than on household wealth. In doing this, we follow Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) and depart from the work summarized in Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) or Engen and Gale (1996) , who focus on the impact of tax incentives to retirement saving on household wealth.
While household wealth is a very important outcome, household consumption also conveys complementary useful information. In the presence of employer contributions, household consumption is more likely to reflect how the flow of active household saving is affected by tax incentives than household wealth (see Chernouzhukov and Hansen, 2001 ). Moreover, according to the permanent income hypotheses, household wealth is much more affected by transitory income changes than household consumption (Blundell and Preston, 1998) . Any analysis that focuses on group-specific changes in household wealth over time faces the problem of disentangling between the impact of tax incentives and the impact of different forms of between-group income changes. 7 Thirdly, we extend the techniques in Attanasio and de Leire (2002) , who infer the impact of tax incentives on new saving by comparing the consumption changes of new contributors to those of old contributors. Bernheim (2002) and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) object that the variation associated to actual contributions may reflect other variables (preference for present consumption, income risk, borrowing constraints, preference for liquid portfolios) rather than the incentive to save. 8 To get around the omitted variables problem, we build a variable that summarizes the incentives to contribute. Our instrumental variable is the interaction between the income marginal tax rate and the age of the individual at the time of introduction of the exemption. Individuals with higher income marginal tax rates experiment a higher increase in post-tax returns (Milligan 2001, who cites many others) and age proxies income risk and preference for liquid assets. We check that our variable is indeed a strong predictor of contributions: it was mainly filers in the top quartile of labor earnings who exempted contributions and, within that group, average contributions increased monotonically with age. Using a separate expenditure survey, we then examine if the consumption growth of broad age groups in the top income quartile, relative to our control group of young households, experienced a drop around the introduction of the exemption.
Our results suggest that there is indeed substantial heterogeneity in the contributions to pension funds and in the response of household saving to tax incentives. While the overall amount of new saving we estimate is limited (at most 25 cents per euro contributed on average), saving responses differ substantially across age groups -a finding also reported in the literature on 401(k)s. 9 7 Also, using consumption allows comparisons of tax incentives across countries. While virtually every European country has an expenditure survey, very few countries have detailed SCF or SIPP -type of household wealth surveys. 8 A first objection by Bernheim (2002) is that the timing of contributions is correlated with saving preferences of the households, and that such differences are hard to detect using consumption growth -a poor indicator of intrinsic thrift according to Bernheim, Skinner and Weingberg (1997) . In addition, Bernheim (2002) In particular, we document very small consumption drops among the group of households between 56 and 65 years of age, the group that most actively contributed to the plan. We document a larger decrease in consumption expenditures of the group of households between 46 and 55 years of age. A way of interpreting such pattern of responses is that households in the verge of retirement find pension funds and other saving forms as strong substitutes, and tend to exhaust tax-exempted contribution limits by reshuffling their wealth portfolios. Conversely, groups further away from retirement, with plausibly less accumulated wealth and for whom contribution limits are plausibly not binding, need to save more to take advantage of the tax incentives of retirement savings.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the main regulation of pension funds in Spain when tax incentives were introduced in 1988. Section 3 contains some theoretical discussion of the factors determining the impact of the introduction of tax incentives on retirement saving. Section 4 discusses the characteristics of the panel data of tax returns and of the expenditure panel used for the empirical exercise. Section 5 examines the incidence of contributions over time, while Sections 6 and 7 compare contributions and the evolution of consumption across population cohorts in order to infer their effects on the level of saving. Finally, Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
The introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings in Spain
In Spain the first piece of legislation regulating private pension funds was not passed until 1987, when the Ley de Planes y Fondos de Pensiones (formally, Ley 8/87 ) established three types of private pension plans: employment plans (planes de empleo), under which the sponsor is a non-financial firm while its employees are the plan members, associate plans (planes asociados), under which the sponsor is some legal association and the association members are entitled to contribute to the plan, and individual plans (planes individuales), created by financial entities -that act as sponsors -and open to any individual who wants to contribute. Contributions to these funds were exempted from income taxation, up to certain limits. More concretely, contributions below the minimum of 15% of labour income and half a million pesetas (3,005.06 euros) where directly deducted from the income tax base. An additional 15% of contributions beyond this limit but below 750,000 pesetas (4,507.59 euros) was deductible from the income tax quota. It is worth noting that up to 1987, the income tax levied household individual partners jointly. Since 1988, however, couples may decide whether to be taxed jointly or individually. In the former case (joint income tax return) limits apply to each spouse individually, and therefore could even and age groups. 6 double for households opting for joint income taxation. 10 Upon redemption, funds were subject to income taxation at different rates depending upon how redemption took place. They were considered non-regular income if received as a single payment and as a regular income when received in the form of annuities. In the first case, 40% of the payment was exempted from taxation, while in the second case it was taxed at the marginal tax rate on income. As the income tax on non-regular income is lower than that on regular income -in order to correct the distortion created by tax rates that increase with income levels when multi-period income accumulates in a single year -redemption in the form of a single payment was, in general, much more prevalent.
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As in this paper we focus on the effects on household consumption of the introduction of tax incentives of retirement saving, it is important to bear in mind that two other important changes in household income taxation were introduced in 1988. On the one hand, income marginal tax rates were substantially modified. The rate was set to zero for income below 600,000 pts (3,606.07 euros) and raised to from 8% to 25%, at that income level. The number of rates was reduced from 34 to 16, and the maximum one was set at 56%, 10 percentage points less than one year before. The effects of these changes on household net income and therefore on household consumption will heavily depend on their pre-tax income level. Also, as commented above, in 1988 household individual partners were allowed to decide whether to pay income taxes individually or jointly. As the income tax is highly progressive, households were both spouses had labour income massively opted for individual taxation. 12 
Some theoretical considerations
Typically the analysis of tax incentives of retirement saving is conducted in an equivalent manner to the rise in the marginal rate of return to saving. Under this analysis, tax incentives increase this marginal rate of return so that the impact on saving would depend on substitution and income effects. The relative size of these two effects crucially depends on the prevalence of borrowing constraints and preferences for liquid assets.
To grasp some intuition about the determinants of these effects, let us consider an individual with initial wealth W 0 . When tax incentives for retirement savings are introduced, contributions to pension funds, f, yield a tax deduction which is given by fτ , for f ≤ f and fτ for f > f , where f is the limit applied to contributions for tax-exemption, and τ is the marginal tax rate on income. When the pension fund is redeemed, only a fraction λ of the receipts are subject to the marginal tax rate on income, τ 0 . Thus, assuming that the time discount rate is equal to the accrual rate of the pension fund, contributions to pension funds increase individual wealth by fτ(1 − λτ 0 /τ ), for f ≤ f and fτ (1 − λτ 0 /τ ) for f > f . Hence, the smaller λ and the smaller the ratio between future and current marginal tax rates on income are, the larger this wealth increase is. Insofar as marginal tax rates rise with income, individuals who expect a higher fall in income after retirement would experience a larger wealth increase from contributing to pension funds. This also suggests that individuals will concentrate their contributions to pension funds in those periods when their incomes and, hence the marginal tax rates they face, are highest. 13 Thus, the incentives to contribute in pension funds result from the interaction between tax incentives for retirement saving and the income tax and benefit systems.
Notice that, if there are not borrowing constraints, initial wealth, W 0 , does not determine the optimal contribution to the pension fund. In this case, contributions to pension funds could arise, not only through higher saving, but also by (unconstrained) reshuffling the wealth portfolio. However, when there are borrowing constraints, individuals without initial wealth can only contribute to pension funds by saving more, while individuals with positive wealth could also reshuffle their asset holdings to benefit from the tax incentives of retirement saving.
Finally, if there are borrowing constraints, the decision on retirement saving is also affected by the different liquidity characteristics of retirement savings and other savings. Individuals facing higher income risks would regard retirement savings as an imperfect substitute of normal savings, as the former can only be used to smooth consumption after retirement.
These considerations lead us to conclude that, upon introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings, the effects on saving would be different depending on several individual characteristics, such as, initial wealth, income profile and other factors (household composition, etc.) determining current and future marginal tax rates on income, and borrowing constraints, income risks, and preference for liquidity. For some individuals, with invariant marginal rate of returns to savings, there would be only a wealth effect and no substitution effect, so that their consumption profiles would shift upwards. For others, the marginal rate of return to savings would change, there would be a substitution effect, and, as a result, there would be a change in the slope of their consumption profiles.
Since in the data we cannot identify all of the factors determining income and substitution effects, we characterize the impact of tax incentives of retirement savings on total saving using demographic and income groups. First, we condition the analysis of the contribution to pension funds by focusing on individuals at the top of the income distribution, that at the time of the reform faced the highest income marginal tax rates. We regard individuals between 20-35 years when tax incentives were introduced as the most likely to have accumulated less wealth and to find pension funds less attractive for liquidity reasons (see Gale and Scholz, 1994 for a similar reasoning). Hence, we expect contributions to pension funds from these individuals to be low. We also expect contributions to pension funds to increase with age and marginal tax rates on income. As for impact on consumption, we expect to find a larger consumption drop among medium-age individuals with high income. For these individuals incentives for contributing to pension funds are largest, as income and marginal tax rates on income are at their peaks, and uncertainty and liquidity considerations are less important than for younger individuals. Also, for this population group, accumulated wealth is not at its highest, so that reshuffling under borrowing constraints cannot be too large, and contributions to pension funds need to arise from lower consumption. Finally for older individuals, close to retirement, wealth is higher and liquidity considerations are even less relevant, so that contributions to pension funds are more likely to arise from reshuffling of the wealth portfolio than from higher saving.
Data sets and empirical strategy
We use two data sets. The first is a micro panel of tax returns filed by individuals between 1982 and 1998 and collected by the Spanish Tax Agency (the so-called Panel of Income Tax Returns). The second is a household expenditure survey.
The Panel of Income Tax Returns
In 1987 the Spanish tax authority sampled 1 in 25 tax returns in 48 out of the 52 Spanish provinces, and then tracked back the returns of those filers from 1982 and forward until 1998. 14 To maintain the representativeness of the sample, the tax authority also added in each year after 1988 a refreshment sample with new tax returns. The introduction of the pension fund program in 1988 coincided with a major tax change. Before 1988, married couples had to file jointly. After the tax reform in 1988 the two members of a married couple were allowed to file separate tax returns. The 1988 reform had direct consequences both for the design of the sample and for the validity of our analysis. We start by discussing the consequences for the sample, and differ the discussion on the implications for our analysis to Section 6.3. Due to compulsory joint filing in the year in which the sample was made, the Statistical Agency was able to identify pre-1988 "fiscal households" and then keep track of the tax returns filed by each member of the original 1987 couple -even if married filers opted for filing separately in a particular year.
We mainly use the tax return sample to identify who contributed to pension funds at the onset of the program and to quantify the mean contribution by groups. The unit of our analysis is the 1987 tax filing unit. The Panel of Income Tax Returns contains all the information contained in a tax return (excluding all information that can threat anonymity). We collect the amount contributed to pension funds by each tax return in the filing unit. We include both individual and employer contributions, but nothing substantially changes when we exclude employer contributions, which represented a very small fraction of the total in the immediate years after the introduction of the tax incentives. We also use the yearly income of the tax filing unit and some information on household composition (marital status and the number of children below 18 years of age). For 70% of the original 1987 sample, the Tax Agency also collected the age of the main filer. We only use the sub-sample that contains age. 15 The evolution of the fraction of tax units with at least one contributor is shown in Table 1 , Panel A, Column 1. While initially low, the fraction of contributors rapidly expanded during the 80s, and at the end of the decade some 24% of tax filers had made a contribution. Possibly because contributors in 1988 reported higher incomes than contributors who did their initial contribution after that year, the mean and median contribution declined in real terms during the decade: from 221,873 pts. (1,337 euros in Table 1 Table 1 ), last row. As we discuss below, the vast majority of contributions (70%) were made by filing units that reported gross labor income in the top quartile of the income distribution. Contributions in the high end of the income distribution were relatively persistent: 81% of contributors who were in the top income quintile in 1988 and started contributing would contribute on the following year, and the average number of contributions over a six-year period was 5.04 (see Table A.1) We focus the analysis on the years following the introduction of the tax exemption: 1988-1991. Panel B of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of this sub-sample. The mean gross labor income reported by the tax unit was 2,319,635 pts. (13,974 euros). The (unconditional) average contribution is 10,927 pts. (65,7 euros) with 5% of tax units actually making a contribution. The mean age of the main filer is 41 years.
The Household Expenditure Survey (ECPF)
The second sample uses the 1985-1991 waves of a quarterly expenditure survey called Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (henceforth, ECPF). 16 The ECPF interviews some 3,000 households in each wave. Households are 15 We have dropped the contributions to pension funds by tax filers who report self-employed income, since in this case income reported could be subject to serious measurement bias. 16 
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handed a notebook to record their expenses on food, transportation, textiles, health and schooling during some weeks of the quarter (see footnote 16). Also, households report retrospective information about more bulky purchases, like furniture, cars, electronic goods (TV, and others) and white goods (washing machines, dishwashers, fridges). Respondent households are tracked during eight quarters (at most), and report information about household composition and the income received by each household member, with some disaggregation on net-of-tax income sources. We focus on households headed by an employed individual.
The reason to focus only on a few waves is that one should only observe a consumption drop when households start contributing and presumably adjust their savings plan in response to the introduction of tax incentives. After that initial period, the life-cycle hypothesis predicts that, holding other variables constant, individuals who face higher interest rates tend to delay consumption to the future. 17 Thus, we use the period up to 1991, when we observe more new filers starting to contribute (see Table 1 , Panel A, first column).
Ideally , the key variables in our analysis would be total household expenditures and the household-specific marginal taxes to labor income. However, while we make limited use of income marginal tax rates, not directly observed in this survey, most of our analysis focuses on pre-tax income, and concentrate on the top two quartiles of the labor income distribution. We obtained yearly pre-tax income by applying the withholding tax rates and adding contributions to the post-tax income reported in the ECPF (See Appendices 1 and 2 for details). Regarding household expenditures, we have little priors on how specific household consumption components react to changes in tax incentives. Thus, and following Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) , we include basically all consumption components (including the expenditure in all durable goods, but housing) and present results separately by type of good. The main characteristics of the subsamples are shown in Tables 2A (all households ) and 2B (the top two quartiles of the income distribution).
Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. The first verifies that gross labor earnings at the time of the introduction of the tax incentives of retirement saving are strong predictors of both the probability of contributing and of the amount contributed to pension funds. To that end, we use the panel of tax returns.
The second step builds on the previous results and examines the evolution of mean consumption growth of the groups that, according to the panel of tax returns, used the contributions most heavily. The data set used in this step is the Expenditure Survey. While this strategy allows us to detect consumption drops around the time of the introduction of the tax incentives, we cannot quantify how much new saving is created. 17 See Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) who discuss this point in detail.
11
Thus, in the third step we use Two-Sample Two Stage Least Squares to relate mean contributions to pension funds and mean drops in expenditure.
In what follows, we discuss each of these steps in detail.
Distribution of contributions when tax incentives were introduced
Following the theoretical considerations sketched in Section 3, we examine both contributions to pension funds around the date of the introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings. As already mentioned, we expect households with higher income marginal tax rates to experience a larger wealth effect from tax incentives and, thus, to have a higher incentive to contribute. Secondly, within households with similar income marginal tax rates, those in the latter part of their working lives are most likely to contribute, as wealth is plausibly higher, and income risk and liquidity considerations are less relevant. We check these hypotheses using the panel of tax returns to compute the average probability of contributing and the average contribution by age group (holding the quartile of labor earnings constant). We divide the sample along two dimensions: i) age groups (in four 10-years brackets), and ii) the quartile of the pre-tax labor earnings of the 1987 tax filing unit. This easily identifies individuals who contributed to pension funds by most after the introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings.
Changes in expenditure when tax incentives were introduced
In the second step we compare the consumption growth for individuals with high income marginal tax rates in the later part of their working lives (the group with the highest incentive to contribute) to that of individuals with high income marginal tax rates and headed by a person below 35 years of age (the group with the lowest incentive). Notice that everyone who files a tax return qualifies for the subsidy, so that a group of ineligibles does not really exist. Instead, our definition of "treatment" and "control" groups is guided by the differential incentive to contribute faced by households with different income levels. 18 This test based on consumption growth has the advantage of controlling for unobserved differences between the "control" and "treatment" group, as long as they remain constant over time. It is also unaffected by trends in saving that affected similarly to individuals within the same income quartile or within the same age group. 19 We estimate the following equation separately for the top two quartiles of pre-tax family earnings (where the earnings quartile is determined by the first time we observe the household in the sample):
The dependent variable is the household-specific difference between expenditure four quarters-ahead and current expenditure. We use a broad measure of expenditure, including durable and non durable goods. 20 Age_i are three dummies indicating whether or not the household head is between 36 and 45 years old, 46 and 55 years old, or 56 and 65 years old. P OST 88 q is a dummy indicating whether or not quarter q is before or after 1987.1 (that is, if the fourperiods ahead observation on expenditure happens after the introduction of the program). X it contains year and quarter dummies (excluding the fourth), the level and 4-quarter change in household size (number of members) and composition (the number ad the 4-quarter change of the number of children between 1 and 2 years of age, of the number of children between 3 and 5, 6 and 13, 14 and 17 and after 65 years of age). It also contains the level of gross household earnings and the four-quarter change in household earnings. To control for the change in reporting mode in 1988, that may have increased the expected lifetime income of couples by allowing separate filing, we include two extra dummies: i) an intercept of "both members of the couple work", and ii) "both members work" interacted with the post 88 dummy. We think that those variables capture any mechanical effect of separate filing on expected lifetime income. As for behavioral responses, we briefly discuss them in Section 6.3. We do not include changes in other sources of income (like interest rates), because saving in interest-yielding assets is likely to change due to the introduction of the exemption.
The coefficients β 1 , β 2 and β 3 give the averages of individual changes in expenditure growth in a specific demographic group relative to the "base" group. Those averages mix households that contribute to pension funds and those that do not. Note that only contributors faced a positive wealth effect at the time of the introduction of the program. If contributions were financed from changes in havior between households eligible and non-eligible for 401(k) and disregard the comparison between contributors and non-contributors. To reinforce our argument, notice that variations in actual contributions are correlated with unobserved variables that may have a separate impact on consumption growth beyond interest rate increases (time preference or changes in the preferences for liquidity). 20 Namely, our measure includes both non-durable consumption (food, tobacco, alcohol, leisure and health-related expenses) and lumply durable goods (furniture, textiles, children schooling and automobile expenses). Browning and Collado (2001) focus on the latter set of goods in a study of expenditure responses to sharp predictable income changes.
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consumption we would expect β 1 , β 2 and β 3 to be negative. On the contrary, if contributions were financed from reshuffling assets, and not from higher saving, we would expect β 1 , β 2 and β 3 to be zero or non-negative. 21 Mean impacts on consumption changes may not be the only relevant moment. The proportion of filers who contributed to pension funds between 1988 and 1991 was low (see Table 1 ). Thus, the introduction of tax incentives is unlikely to have generated a constant impact throughout the distribution of consumption changes; on the contrary, it is likely to be located in specific centiles of the distribution. Secondly, our expenditure measure includes durable goods. If households delayed the purchase of a car or of new furniture to finance their contributions, we would expect again a nonlinear impact over the distribution of expenditure changes. Thus, as a further specification check, we report quartile regression estimates of the impact of the interaction of age dummies and income group on the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of the distribution of consumption changes. Finally, and given that consumption growth is clearly heteroskedastic, we tighten our estimates presenting Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimates, weighting observations by the inverse of the absolute value of the residual of a consumption change equation estimated by OLS. 22 
Robustness check
A potential problem with model (1) is that it attributes any differential trend in expenditure growth that happened between 1985 and 1990 in the age groups we consider to the introduction of tax incentives of retirement saving. To control for age-specific trends, in some specifications we use as a benchmark the evolution of consumption of the group with incomes between the 50th and the 75th centile of the distribution of earnings (a group with high income levels but lower incentives to contribute). Namely, using the subsample of households whose income is 21 We compute standard errors allowing arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within observations from the same household. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) argue that, under certain circumstances (positively autocorrelated dependent variable), standard errors in DD applications may be artificially low. However, note that in our case, the dependent variable, changes in log consumption is negatively autocorrelated (coefficient of group-specific autocorrelation: -.16), in which case the standard errors we report Bertrand et al's concerns do not apply necessarily. 22 WLS does not always lead to unbiased estimators due to the difficulties in modelling variances. To assess whether or not this is a problem, Table 4 reports both OLS and WLS estimates below, to permit informal comparisons of the differences in point estimates.
14 above the median, we estimate the following model:
Model (2) attributes to tax incentives any trend in the expenditure growth of households in the later part of their working life and in the upper quartile of the distribution of earnings that is different from the corresponding trend in the second quartile of the distribution of earnings. Model (2) makes the implicit assumption that, if tax incentives of retirement saving had not been introduced, the difference in consumption growth between households in the top quartile with ages above 45 and households below 35 would have evolved as the same difference among households in the second-to-top income quartile.
The impact of contributions to pension funds on new household saving
A parameter commonly used in the literature that evaluates the impact of tax incentives on retirement saving is "How much new saving does an extra euro of contributions generate"? The strategy described above cannot address that question. To assess the amount of new saving generated by the tax incentives, and following Angrist and Krueger (1992), we combine moments from the two samples using 2SLS estimates. Namely, we are interested in the parameter α 1 of the following relationship:
where C it measures yearly consumption, Contr it is the amount contributed to pension funds and X it are covariates that include time effects, age effects and other variables. Most likely, Contr it is correlated with ε it because households that contribute would have had a different consumption level even in the absence of contributions than other households, due to heterogeneity in preferences for present consumption and for liquid portfolios. Thus, we instrument Contr it with our identifying variable: an age trend that differs with respect to the 20-35 age group that operates after 1988 (only) within the top income quartile. We assume that such differential trend only affects consumption growth through its impact on contributions to pension funds, then is correlated with contributions but not with consumption. Thus, we estimate α 1 using a two-sample instrumental variable regression. In the panel of tax returns, we estimate 15
In the second sample (the consumption survey), we estimate
where Contr it is the OLS prediction in the sample of tax returns. 23 Finally, two note of caution about the TSLS exercise. First, both samples differ in their sampling methods and population coverage: The panel of tax returns captures the rich in a much better way that the panel of expenditure. While we think that this is less of a problem for the former two steps procedure, that only involves identifying broad groups that contribute, it may be somewhat problematic for imputing contributions within cells. Secondly, the specifications with the level of consumption as a dependent variable are somewhat noisy, leading to imprecise estimates. For these two reasons, we emphasize less these results on new savings.
5 By how much did tax incentives promote contributions to pension funds? Table 3 presents the size of contributions to pension funds of different population groups obtained using the 1988-1991 waves of the Panel of Tax Returns. Population groups are defined by age groups (in four 10-year brackets) and the pre-tax labor earnings of the 1987 tax filing unit. The centiles are computed using the Expenditure Survey, to keep consistency across samples. Panel A shows the distribution of contributions in the top quartile of the labor earnings distribution. The unconditional mean contribution IS increasing with age; the unconditional mean contribution (Table 3 , row 1 Column 1) in the lowest age group is 10,435 pts (62.72 euros); the same mean contribution in the group close to retirement (Table 3 , row 1, column 4) is four times higher, 44,789 pts. (269.2 euros ).The percentage of filing units with at least one contributor was relatively small and also varies monotonically with age, from 6% in the group of filers with ages between 20 and 35 years of age to 12% in the group between 56 and 65 years of age (Table 3 , Panel A, row 2, columns 1 and 4, respectively).
The proportion of filers exhausting the limits is roughly constant up to 56 years of age (12 percent of tax filers who contributed to pension funds in the previous years, row 4 Panel A of Table 3 ). In the latter part of the working life, the fraction is much higher, 30% (Table 3 , row 4 column 4). That finding is consistent with our prior that a substantial fraction of the contributions to pension funds of filers in the later part of their working life may arise from reshuffling wealth portfolios.
Panels B and C in Table 3 present similar summary statistics for the second quartile of the labor income distribution (Panel B) and the bottom two quartiles (Panel C). The unconditional group-specific average population fraction that contributed to pension fund is between 3 and 6 times smaller than in the top earnings quartile. Still, for all age groups, the fraction of contributors in the verge of retirement that exhaust the tax-exemption limit is about 30%.
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that, if there is an impact of contributions on household expenditure, it can mostly be found in the top quartile of the (gross) earnings distribution. In addition, the impact should vary with age. Of course, households in the bottom three quartiles of the income distribution may have made substantial contributions to pension funds. Nevertheless, as a group, we can only expect a little impact of the introduction of pension funds on the expenditure of the bottom three quartiles of the income distribution. This leads us to make some use of households in the second-to-top income quartile as an additional control group.
6 Did tax incentives to retirement savings raise households' saving rates?
This section presents the estimates of the drop in consumption expenditures around the introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings, and relates them to the size of contributions to pension funds. Our empirical strategy attributes to the introduction of the exemption any differential negative trend in the expenditure growth of prime-age and close-to-retirement households that is present in the top income quartile, but not in the second-to-top income quartile. Table A .2 presents our empirical strategy in diffs-in-diffs form. Each entry in Table A .2 shows the average of household specific expenditure growth, by income and age groups. Row 1 column 1 of table A.2 shows that, prior to the exemption, average consumption growth in the top income quartile for the 46-65 age group was 6.5%, while in the group of 20-35 years of age consumption growth was basically zero (row 2, column 1 of table A.2). After the introduction of the exemption, consumption growth in the group of 46-65 years of age dropped to 1.2%, while it was 6.5% in the group of 20-35 years of age. This results in a diffs-in-diffs estimate of 12%. Row 4 in the second panel shows the change in consumption growth for the age 46-65 age group in the second-to-top income quartile. That group experimented an increase in expenditure growth of 5% (see row 4, column 3). In the second-to-top income quartile, households in the 20-35 age group experimented an average expenditure growth of 8.4%. The corresponding diffs-in-diffs estimate is -3.3%, much lower than the 12% in row 3, column 3.
We provide further illustration of the dynamics of the effect in Figures 1  and 2 . To detect if there was an age related discontinuity (starting in 1987) in consumption growth, we ran year-specific OLS regressions of one-year-ahead household expenditure growth on two dummies indicating whether the age of the head was between 46 and 65 years of age or between 36 and 45 years of age. 24 Each estimate in each year measures the difference in log expenditure growth between households in the later part of the life-cycle and our control group of young households. Figure 1 shows the estimates of the yearly age dummies for households in the top income quartile. Before the exemption (in years 1985 and 1986), log-expenditure changes of groups above 36 and 45 years of age were .06 points larger than those of the 20-35 age group. Expenditure growth of groups above 36 became negative in 1987 and stayed so during the rest of the sample period. Figure 2 shows the corresponding estimates for households in the second-to-top income quartile (who contributed much less to pension funds). While in this group the evolution is somewhat noisy in 1987, unlike households in the top income quartile, one-year ahead expenditure growth was positive both before and after 1988.
D-in-D evidence
We start by examining the evolution of household expenditure among households in the top quartile of the income distribution using estimates from equation (1). Consumption growth of individuals between 56 and 65 years of age (relative to households between 20 and 35 years of age) is estimated to have fallen by 9.2% after the introduction of the program (row 1 column 1 of Table  4 ). However, this estimate is very imprecise and not significantly different from zero ( the standard error is 10.6%). The corresponding drop in consumption expenditure growth for the group between 46 and 55 years of age is 14.4%, significantly different from zero at the 10 percent confidence level (row 2, column 1, Table 4 ). Finally, for the group between 36 and 45 years of age the drop in relative consumption expenditure growth is 7.5%, which is consistent with the notion that households cut their expenses upon the introduction of the program. Nevertheless, the results are very imprecise.
Column 2 presents Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimates that suggest relatively similar effects, but much more precise standard errors. The impact is again negative for all age groups and significantly different from zero at conventional confidence levels. The impact is not monotonic with age, and the highest impact is located among the group with 46-55 years of age.
As mentioned above, both the fact that few households had exempted contributions in the early years following 1988 and the presence of durable goods in our measure of expenditure leads us to expect that the age-specific drop in consumption growth was not uniform. Columns 3 through 6 of Table 4 confirm that hypothesis for the group of individuals between 46 and 55 years of age. The estimates shown in row 2, columns 3-5 of Table 4 suggest that the drops in 24 The omitted group are households headed by a person between 20 and 35 years of age. To hold household composition constant, we also add as covariates one-year changes in demographics (changes in the number of children, elderly and overall number of household members).
18 consumption growth were driven by a few large changes: the 75th-centile of the consumption drop was 26 log points (standard error: .12) and the 90th centile (a drop of .33 log-points, with an standard error of .17 log-points). 25 Conversely median consumption growth did not change as much (19.7 log points, but the standard error is 10.2). In other words, the average drop in expenditure is due to the behavior of a limited set of households. For households close to retirement (56-65), we find a constant drop at different centiles, a finding that leads us to suspect that the estimates in row 1, Column 1 of Table 4 may reflect other trends. Finally, for our youngest treatment group (individuals between 36-45 years of age), while the estimates are not significantly different from zero, the magnitude of the coefficients also suggests that the fall in consumption expenditure growth was concentrated in the very high centiles (-22 log-points at the 90th centile).
Rows 4 through 6 of Table 4 present estimates from a similar specification to that in Panel A, but for households with incomes between the 50th and the 75th centiles. Those households faced lower marginal tax rates on income and contributed less on average, as documented in Table 3 . Thus, if the decreases in consumption expenditure growth documented in rows 1-3 of Table 4 are indeed due to the introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings, we should find lower impact of the introduction of the program on their consumption growth. The point estimates in row 5 (the group between 46 and 55 years of age) confirms that prior: the drop in consumption growth oscillates between .033 (OLS specification) and .046 (WLS specification) and they are significantly lower than in the top quartile of the distribution of earnings. Further, the distribution of the drop in expenditure among the 46-55 age group is very different from that in the top income quartile: the drop in consumption growth is not located at the largest centiles of the distribution of consumption growth, but is basically uniform over the distribution.
Rows 7 through 9 in Table 4 repeat the analysis now using the change in the level (rather than logs) of consumption expenditures. The advantage of that specification is that one can readily interpret the magnitude of the consumption drop and informally compare it to the estimates in Table 3 , to see how likely it is that the drop in consumption was indeed due to increases in contributions to pension funds. The results in row 8 of Column 1 suggest that average expenditure among the group with ages between 46 and 55 fell by about 464 euros and that the average drop was far from constant, but driven by a relatively small set of households. Note that this average is much higher than the excess contribution of the 46-55 group with respect to the base group with ages between 20 and 35: (102 euros, as it results from substracting Column 1, row 1 from Column 4, row 1 in Table 3 ).
In rows 10 to 12 of Table 4 , we examine the concepts of expenditure that fall, and run a regression similar to equation (1), but in which the dependent variable only contains the following set of durable goods: "white" durable goods (purchases of fridges, dishwashers, washing machines... etc.), electronic goods (TVs, radios, CD players), cars and furniture. The results in row 11 suggest that, among the group that most diminished expenditure (46-55 years of age), the bulk of the adjustment happened due to a drop in expenses of durable goods. Results (not shown) also suggest that the drop in the expenditure growth of nondurable goods (food, textiles, transportation, health and entertainment) after 1988 was around 65 euros (standard error: 37,5 euros) among the group with ages between 46 and 55 years of age and a not-significant drop of 89 euros, (standard error: 428.6 euros) at the 90th centile of the distribution of consumption. The fact that most of the adjustment happened through durable expenditure raises several issues, that we discuss in Section 7. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the fact that the adjustment occurred through durables, coupled with the persistence of contributions (see Table A .1), gives a potential explanation of the discrepancy between the estimated consumption drop and the average annual contribution; households cut the stream of payments involved in the purchase of a durable good to sustain their contributions.
Overall, from Table 4 we draw four main conclusions. First, the introduction in 1988 of tax incentives of retirement savings coincided with a drop in consumption expenditure growth among the treatment group of households between 45 and 56 years of age in the top income quartile, relative to our control group of households between 20 and 35 years of age. We find little evidence of such an impact for households headed by individuals close to retirement age, a finding we discuss below. Secondly, the drop in both the log and in the level of household consumption expenditures is driven by a few large changes, consistent with the notion that only a small fraction of households made contributions to pension funds. Thirdly, further evidence for the differential trend among the 46-55 age group between 1985 and 1991 being due to contributions to pension funds is the fact that the drop in expenditure was much lower within households in the same age group (46-55 years of age) within the second-to-the top income quartile (that, as a group, contributed much less to pension funds in the onset of the program). Fourthly, the evidence in the bottom part of Table 4 also suggests that households in the top quartile of the income distribution and who were between 46 and 55 years of age reacted to the introduction of the program by delaying bulky expenditures.
Controlling for age-specific trends
A problem with the evidence presented in Table 4 is that we detect a drop in expenditure growth for households that, as a group, did not contribute much to pension funds; in particular households between 46 and 55 years of age and those between 36 and 45 in the second-to-the top income quartile also experimented drops in expenditure growth around the time of the introduction of the exemption. An interpretation of that evidence is that there were other trends that depressed expenditure growth for those age groups and were not related to the introduction of tax incentives of retirement saving. Table 5 presents results from using an alternative strategy to "net out" age-20 specific trends. In Panel A, we substract the estimate of the drop in expenditure presented in Table 4 , rows 1-3. column 2 (that among households in the top quartile of the income distribution) to the corresponding drop in expenditure reported in Table 4 , rows 4-6 column (2). We do this by using the tripledifferences estimator in (2). We report WLS, and estimates of the expenditure drop at different centiles. The estimates are very similar to those reported in Table 4 , rows 1-3, and we do not comment them in detail. Panel B of Table 5 experiments with an additional source of identification. Our results so far use income quartiles to identify treatment and control groups. Yet, according to the theoretical discussion above, tax incentives of retirement saving operate through the income marginal tax rate. The reason is that households with higher income marginal tax rates experience a larger increase in the return to retirement saving and consequently a stronger substitution effect. Hence, we explore if the expenditure drop after the introduction of tax incentives is stronger among households that faced higher income marginal tax rates 26 We estimate the following model again for the top two quartiles of the distribution of earnings.
where Age_i stands for three age group dummies: 36-45, 46-55 and 56-65. The parameters of interest are δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 that measure the age-specific impact of income marginal tax rates on the average expenditure drop after the introduction of the exemption. If higher income marginal tax rates are associated to larger drops in consumption growth for all age groups, we should expect δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 to be negative. The results shown in Table 5 , Panel B confirm that for the group between ages 46 and 55, higher consumption drops happened among households with higher income marginal tax rates.
Other changes correlated with the introduction of the exemption
The exemption was introduced at the same time as a change in marginal income taxes and tax splitting. To control for the change in marginal tax rates, we have ran regressions very similar to (1) in the ECPF using marginal taxes as the dependent variable, finding very small effects. Possibly, the reason for this is that the new marginal taxes either affected households in the bottom of the income distribution (excluded from our subsample) or at the very top of the income distribution (who probably do not participate in an expenditure survey). Furthermore, we examine if our key variable that identifies the incentive to contribute (a differential trend between 1985 and 1990 among different age groups in the top quartile of the income distribution) is correlated with other outcomes, such as:
1) Purchase of a house: Table A .3 shows the evolution of the probability of purchasing a house in the ECPF before and after the 1988 reform, by age group. We find a sizable drop (-1.7 percent, relative to a overall statistic of 2.3 percent) in the probability of doing so in our base group, perhaps indicating that the drop in expenditure in the 46-55 age group was not confined to "small" durables.
2) Joint filing: The introduction of tax incentives of retirement savings in 1988 coincided with a major tax reform that changed compulsory joint filing to voluntary individual or joint filing. Such reform is likely to have changed the income marginal tax rate and the taxable income of households. In other words, the 1988 introduction of separate filing may have affected the expected permanent income and consumption of different age groups. For example, if joint filing was specially prevalent among households headed by our control group (persons between 18 and 36 years of age), the estimates in Model (1) would attribute to tax incentives what really is an income effect associated to a positive shock to labor supply. In principle, we focus on the top income quartile, that experienced similar tax changes, but there could be a problem if the option of separate tax filing affected differently different age groups. We check that possibility in Table A.3. Table A. 3 Column 2 shows the impact of our instrument ( a post-1988 dummy) on the probability that a tax filing unit files jointly. The group of tax filers headed by a person between 46 and 55 years of age was 3.7% more likely to file jointly than the base group. Thus, as a consequence of the tax reform, the 46-55 age group did not experience such an income increase as the base group. Still, it is not clear to what extent this is a problem. First, while the estimate is very precise, it is relatively small: less than 4% with respect to 64% of filers who filed jointly in that income group. Secondly, we control for changes in family income in our consumption regressions shown in Table 4 , for an indicator of whether both members of the couple work and an interaction of that variable with the post 88 dummy.
3) Spouse participation: While the effect estimated is large (8 percent points), as shown in Column 3 of Table 5 , it is also very imprecisely estimated and not significantly different from zero. In addition such drop in participation is hard to reconcile with such a tiny impact of our instrument on joint filing.
While we need to work more on the confounding impact of the 1988 separate tax filing, it is not that clear that all the impact in Tables 4 and 5 is driven by such reform. This section combines expenditure data and data from contributions to estimate how much new saving was generated by the introduction of pension funds. The evidence in Table 4 suggest that the adjustment among the group with ages between 46 and 55 and in the top income quartile happened through drops in durable consumption expenditures (i.e., households delayed the purchase of a new car or furniture to contribute to pension funds). By definition, the periodicity of those expenses exceeds the year, so unadjusted comparisons of annual contributions to drops in observed expenditure with periodicity over the year are not informative. 27 We use the depreciation rates in Fraumeni (1997) to distribute among several periods the bulky expenditure in durable goods when we observe one such purchase in the data. Namely, whenever we observe the purchase of a durable good, we attribute to the year of the purchase (and subsequent periods if the household stays in the sample) the fraction of the purchase that is depreciated. 28 Unfortunately, we can estimate neither the flow of services from durables obtained by households who own durables but do not make a transaction during the sample period nor, for households that engage in a transaction, the consumption of the durable goods owned prior to the purchase of a new good. We suspect that our measure overestimates consumption drops (basically, because we assign a zero to pre-purchase consumption of durable goods). Summary statistics of those variables are shown in Table 2 . Table 6 reproduces the results in Table 4 , now using our corrected measure of expenditure. The WLS results in rows 1 through 3 of Table 6 are qualitatively consistent with those in Table 4 but the magnitude is of course much lower (for the 46-55 group, we estimate a drop in our consumption measure of 2.8 percent). For the rest of the groups, we document small and not significantly different from zero drops in expenditure, once we distribute expenditures in durables among periods.
The second Panel in Table 6 documents the evolution of the level of periodified expenditure around the introduction of the tax incentives. The average expenditure drop in the 46-55 year-old group is about 72 euros, standard error: 40 euros. We find positive effects for the age groups of 56-65 and 36-45.
Columns 2-4 of Table 6 provide an informal assessment of the extent of new saving by age group within the top quartile of the family earnings distribution. 27 The problem would be solved with either a sufficiently long panel of household expenses or with detailed information about the stock of durables. While the ECPF is one of the longest comprehensive consumption data sets in Europe, it only follows households for up to 2 years. Furthermore, the ECPF contains little information about wealth stocks. 28 Our procedure amounts to multiplying .165 to the observed total payment for a car, .1179 to the cost of furniture, .165 to expenditures in white goods and .1833 for electronic goods like a TV or a radio. We obtain those estimates from Fraumeni (1997) , who in turn obtains the estimates from Hulten and Wykoff (1995) . See Bover (2005) for an application to Spanish data.
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Column 2 presents the drop in consumption estimated in Table 6 , Column 1 relative to the control group, as estimated in Panel A of Table 6 . In Column 3, we document the unconditional average contribution by each group minus the contribution of the control group. The estimates in Column 1 are obtained substracting magnitudes in row 1 of Table 3 . For example, the estimated drop in consumption in the log specification for the 36 to 45 age group (relative to [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] , is presented in row 1 of column 3, and is 48 euros. On average, the 36-45 age group contributed 62 euros more than the 20-35 years of age group, yielding an estimate of increased saving of 77 cents per euro contributed. As for the group between 46 and 55 years of age, they contributed 119 euros more than the 20-35 years of age group, and their consumption fell by 63 euros. In the 46-55 year-old group, 53 cents of new saving were created per euro contributed. Possibly the most surprising result is that in row 1. The contributions of the group that most actively contributed (top income quartile, ages between 56 and 65) represented no new saving at all and most likely came from portfolio reshuffling. In Panel B of Table 7 we present similar results using consumption drop in levels as the dependent variable.
A more formal, but perhaps less informative way of summarizing the degree of new saving created by the pension funds program is to look at two-sample Two Stage Least Squares. 29 Those estimates are presented in Table 7 . The first column in panel A is the first-stage equation, that predicts contributions to pension funds using the age group of the main filer at the time of the introduction of tax incentives, and restricting taxpayers to those who were in the top of the income distribution that year. The age dummies in column 1, Panel A, rows 2-4 are significantly different from zero at any conventional significance level. The TSLS estimate is presented in the second column of Table 7 , panel A, row 1, and is .047 (.20). While extremely imprecise, results suggests that each additional euro of contributions does not reduce average consumption. Columns (3) and (4) include an additional control variable: dummies indicating the income bracket the household belongs to. the rationale is to make predictions for groups that have similar income in both samples. 30 Row 2 of panel A is -.013 and suggests 29 Namely, we use the following procedure. We use the subsample of hosueholds in the panel of tax returns who report incomes in the top quartile of the ECPF distribution of pre-tax earnings. We regress contributions (including zeroes) on the following variables: age dummies, year dummies, a dummy the level of pre-tax household earnings, household composition variables (dummies for one, two, three and more than four descendants, a dummy for the presence of an elderly of more than 65 years of age and the total number of members). We also include one year-change in all variables but age. We use OLS to predict average contributions, but average predictions of contributions do not change much when we use a Tobit model to obtain predictions. We then use the imputed contribution in an OLS regression of the change in the level of consumption on the same set of covariates listed above. Note that we identify the model by not including in the consumption regression an interaction between age group and post 88 dummy. Two final notes regarding the computation of the standard errors. We have used weighted least squares to estimate the models in Table 7 , where the observation-specific weights come from the inverse of the OLS residuals. Alternative weighting schemes like using the inverse of the household-specific standard deviation in OLS residuals did not change much the results. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation between the observations of the same household, but not for generated regressors. 30 The brackets included as regressors are, income between 15,000 and 18,000 euro, another b in table 7 shows TSLS results using the top two quartiles of the ECPF distribution of earnings. The omitted variable is the interaction between age group, a post 88 dummy and a dummy for top income quartile. the estimate in table 7, panel b, rows 1 is -25 cents, suggesting a larger consumption drop than the diffs-in-diffs estimate in panel A.
As we discuss above, those average estimates conceal substantial heterogeneity across age groups.
Concluding Remarks
Tax incentives of retirement savings might increase wealth upon retirement by either increasing savings during individuals working lives or by changing the composition of wealth portfolios towards assets that are more likely to be maintained until retirement age, as it is the case of pension funds. The identification of the global effects of tax incentives of retirement saving is blurred by several difficulties, such as the wide heterogeneity in the individual responses, the lack of microeconomic data on consumption, saving, and wealth through the life cycle, and the differential impact that tax incentives may have at the moment when they are introduced with respect a situation in which they have been operative for a long period.
In this paper we have examined the effects tax incentives of retirement savings in Spain at the period in which they were first introduced. Thus, by using data spanning the periods before and after the introduction of tax-favoured retirement plans, we can observe changes in consumption trends among different groups in the population which could be related to contributions to pension funds. For establishing this relationship, we mostly rely on the fact that individuals with higher income marginal tax rates experiment a higher wealth effect from the introduction of tax incentives, while we use age as proxy for income risk and preference for liquid assets, another dimension in which retirement savings differs from other savings.
While the overall amount of new saving we estimate is limited (at most 25 cents per euro contributed on average), saving responses differ substantially across age groups. In particular, we document very small consumption drops among the group of households between 56 and 65 years of age, the group that most actively contributed to the plan, while we find instead a larger decrease in consumption expenditures of the group of households between 46 and 55 years of age. In our view, these results cast doubts about the effectiveness of these tax incentives to promote retirement savings, specially when compared to the fiscal costs that they have in terms of lost government revenues. Nevertheless, a full assessment of these incentives would require the measurement on its impact on wealth upon retirement, a task which is in our agenda for future work.
one for between 18,000 and 24,000 euro, another one for income between 24,000 and 30,000 euro and a final one for households whose income is above 30,000 euro. 25 
Appendix 1: ECPF Sample construction
We use a sample of 148,679 households-quarters headed by a married ECPF respondents between 1985 and 1996. We exclude 2,228 observations of households that reported zero food expenses at home. We also excluded 87,795 observations of households whose reported income was either missing or who reported monthly net earnings below the statutory minimum wage. 352 observations on households-quarters headed by a retired individual were excluded. 1,227 observations in which the head is unemployed were also dropped (the 19/1987 law did not allow those individuals to contribute to a pension fund). We also dropped 3116 observations of households who reported self-employment income (including farm income). We dropped further 104 cases in which the head of the household was not below 65 or above 20 years of age. 21,471 observations on individuals after 1991 were also dropped. Those restrictions left us with 27,795 cases, that we used to compute year-specific quartiles of the pre-tax earnings distribution (see Appendix 2) . We could define 4-quarters ahead differences in household expenditure for 8,376 cases. 103 cases exhibited expenditure in quarter q+4 that exceeded (were below) by more (less) than 7.38 (0.11) times expenditure in quarter q. We dropped such cases. Overall, we have information on 8,273 cases (Table 2 ).
Appendix 2: Constructing pre-tax earnings in the ECPF
The paper uses pre-tax income group to split the sample. There are two reasons for doing this: the tax return sample provides pre-tax labor earnings and there is a clear link between pre-tax earnings and marginal income taxes (the variable in turn determines the incentive to use a tax-favored product). However, the ECPF questionnaire asks for a measure of monthly post-tax labor income (gross income net of contributions to the Social Security System and income tax withholdings). The ECPF staff converts the monthly report into a quarterly one. We constructed measures of pre-tax earnings out of the ECPF labor income measure using four steps:
Step 1: First, we annualize the quarterly net income report contained in the ECPF. We do this by adding up all the net labor earnings we observe for the individual for each year if the individual is surveyed for four quarters. Otherwise, we convert quarterly income into yearly income by multiplying by the corresponding factor (e.g. 4/3 if the individual is observed in 3 quarters of the calendar year, 2 if the individual is observed in two quarters of the calendar year and 4 if the individual is only observed once in a year).
Step 2: Each year in the sample period, the Spanish law defined a schedule of some 27 brackets of pre-tax earnings y gross (i), where i indexes the bracket number=1,...,27. The schedule varies with the marital status of the individual and the number of children (if any). There are two deductions out of individual gross income: tax withholdings and social security contributions. First, when gross earnings are between y gross (i − 1) and y gross (i) and exceed a minimum amount y min _with , employers withhold a fraction of earnings t inc (i). In addition, a fraction of compulsory contributions to Social Security (typically 6% during the sample period) is substracted from pre-tax earnings if they lie between a minimum level of earnings y min _SS and y max _SS . Using those rules, one can define for each value of gross earnings in the grid y gross (i) a one-to-one corresponding value of "net" earnings y net (i).
Step 3: We start the following recursion: if post-tax labor earnings y net falls below y min _SS , we compute gross earnings as y net + .06y min _SS (during the sample period, y min _SS was below the amount that required employers to withhold taxes). We impute ynet 1−.06 as gross labor earnings if ynet 1−.06 is above y min _SS but below the amount that requires employers to withhold taxes y min _with . For values of net earnings that correspond to a level of pre-tax earnings that require employees to withhold taxes, the imputed amount of gross earnings is
We do the previous steps for each household member reporting employee labor earnings and then compute household pre-tax earnings as the sum of the earnings of the primary and secondary earners (if one exist).
A set of STATA programs and files with the mapping between gross and net earnings is available from the authors upon request. 3. All models include the following covariates (not shown to save space): a POST 88 dummy, dummies for Age 56-65, Age 46-55, Age 36-45, year and quarter dummies, period q family earnings, the change in earnings between q and q+4, the number and 4-quarter change of household members the number of children between 1 and 3, 2 and 5, 6 and 13, 14 and 17 and above 65, and the 4-quarter change a dummy for "both members of the couple work and an interactions of "both work" and post 88. .17 (.03)** +,*,** means that the estimate is different from zero at the 15, 10, 5 percent confidence level. 1. y.75 is the 75th centile of the distribution of family earnings, computed each ECPF survey year 2. Additional regressors in Panel A: Set of regressors listed at bottom of Table 4 3. Additional set of regressors in Panel B: age dummies and regressors listed at bottom of Table 4 Quantile regression Table is the group average of household specific consumption growth over four quarters. Each household contributes as many observations as times is observed in the sample. Standard errors clustered at the household level and computed using an OLS regression of household-specific consumption growth on age dummies, period dummies and the interactions between those variables. 2. "Before 1987.1" means that the first observation used to compute household-specific expenditure growth is observed before 1987.1. Thus, consumption growth does not include any period after the introduction of the exemption. 
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